Steve Ungvari, SPI, Inc.
810-220-8440
sufield@aol.com
Introduction
While product failures have always been a problem,
it seems that with the complexity of today's engineered systems, the number and
the severity of these incidences both in terms of human suffering and damage to
the corporation is increasing at an exponential rate.
The question as to the root cause of this phenomenon and more
importantly, the "fix" is an appropriate one.
Why have traditional methods failed at preventing product failures? To be
sure, some of the fault lies with engineers "going through the
motions" of using the failure prevention tool.
That fact notwithstanding, the conventional tools themselves are not
"foolproof." The
Ideation/TRIZ methodology has a unique component called Anticipatory Failure
Determination™(AFD™)
which, used with conventional methods, greatly enhances the process of failure
prediction and failure prevention. The
Fact Sheet below provides a basis for comparing AFD™
and conventional methods such as Failure Mode & Effects Analysis(FMEA) and
Hazard Operability Analysis (HAZOP).
What is Anticipatory Failure
Determination ™
(AFD™).
Anticipatory Failure Determination™ is based on
the concepts that were called “subversion analysis” in earlier TRIZ work by
Zlotin, Zusman, Altshuller, and Filatov (ref.1, 2) and Kaplan (ref.3).
Software is now available to make the method easier to apply (ref.4) The term “subversion analysis” refers to the basic
technique, described below, of using TRIZ in reverse; that is, TRIZ is used to
find ways to cause the design to fail, or to subvert the basic purpose of the
design. With the knowledge of
how to subvert the design, the developer knows how to make the design better, so
that the failures cannot occur.
AFD™
is a TRIZ method that is a
disciplined, rigorous process by which the user can:
-
thoroughly analyze given failure mechanisms
-
obtain an exhaustive set of potential failure "scenarios"
-
develop
"inventive" solutions to prevent, counteract, or minimize the
impact of the failure scenarios
What is the difference between AFD™
and other conventional failure prevention techniques?
The principle difference between AFD™
and conventional techniques such as Failure Mode and Effects Analysis and Hazard
and Operability Analysis is the perspective from which potential failures are
determined. In the conventional
techniques, the process of failure prediction proceeds linearly from an
articulation of the system's function(s) to what may occur if there is a failure
(absence) in deliverance of these functions.
In other words, the analytical line of logic follows design intent.
Given a potential failure, the effect of the failure, probability of its
occurrence, and the ability to detect the failure is determined. Once these parameters are quantified, often times very
subjectively, a calculation of risk is made.
If the risk is determined to be unacceptably high, changes in design, or
detection capability can be suggested.
On the surface the process sounds logical.
There are, however, serious structural weaknesses with these traditional
approaches.
1.
The first weakness stems from the process used to determine failures.
The process of failure determination is essentially a brainstorming
exercise initiated by probing what failures "might" occur.
This process suffers from the same syndrome that the original product
design process is subject to - Psychological Inertia (PI).
Also, because the analysis of potential failures is accomplished within
the same mental context that created the design in the first place, there is a
serious question of objectivity to be raised with this approach.
Engineers do not like to admit that their designs are failure prone.
2.
A second shortcoming of traditional approaches is that he analysis of
failures is deemed to result from the absence of an intended or designed
function. The issue of
"prohibited" functions is not considered.
For example, the function of a handgun is to shoot a bullet.
All of the failure analysis proceeds along the lines of the original
design intent. The original
designers of the weapon system, for example, did not design it to be used by
children to shoot other children in schools.
This prohibited function is not a part of conventional failure prevention
techniques. Additionally, to be
more complete, functions also need to be analyzed not only from the absence of
intent but also from the perspective of the function being performed
insufficiently or in an excessive way.
3.
The most serious drawback of traditional approaches, however, is the
absence of an integrated problem solving mechanism to pinpoint design
deficiencies accurately as a series of "inventive" problems.
An inventive problem is one characterized by an inherent conflict.
Traditional techniques do not make provisions for solving difficult
technological problems in an inventive way.
An inventive approach recognizes system conflicts and attacks them
head-on. In traditional approaches,
if the design is deemed to be too risky, correction of the problem is
accomplished through a number of design and redesign iterations or, as a
stopgap, - redesign of the detection systems.
When the system deficiency is not defined as an inventive problem, the
results are often costly over designs, or the addition of auxiliary compensating
systems making the original design more complex.
What is different about The
AFD™
System?
All of the structural deficiencies noted
above have been designed out of AFD™.
First of all, the approach to determining potential failures is the reverse
of the one used in conventional approaches.
In AFD, the power of the technique comes from the process of deliberately
"inventing" failures. The
engineer has to transform him or herself into a subversive.
The idea is to invent, cause and create failures. In the case of past
failures, the analytical process challenges one to invent a past failure.
In future failure prevention, the logic proceeds along the lines of
inventing, creating or devising the most catastrophic failures conceivable.
In both instances, the engineer inverts the
problem. The advantage to this
approach is analogous to a defense attorney becoming a prosecutor.
The system's potential flaws are viewed from a perspective that allows
for full exploitation of a system's weaknesses.
It is obvious, when all system deficiencies are made explicit, the team
or individual can take more effective countermeasures.
Failure prevention is transformed from a defensive to an offensive
"inventive" exercise creating a seamless process for failure
determination and prevention.
The process is so effective that users will
sometimes become disenchanted with their system as having so many drawbacks that
it is a wonder it will work at all. This
is normal as these are potential failures.
It is incumbent on the technical analyst to prevent these from ever
occurring.
|
Comparative
Criteria
|
Traditional (FMEA)
|
AFD™
|
|
Purpose of the technique
|
-
Identify potential failure modes and to rate the severity of
their effects
-
Identify Critical and Significant Characteristics
-
Rank order potential design and process deficiencies
-
Help focus on elimination of product and process
deficiencies.
|
-
Analyze previous failures and be able to understand how to
"invent" such failures
-
Identify an exhaustive list of potential failure scenarios as
well as any negative, harmful or undesired effects or phenomenon
-
Transform the process of problem analysis from asking why a
failure occurred to how can a failure be produced
-
To incorporate the full complement of TRIZ operators to
develop innovative solutions
|
|
Scope of applicability
|
|
|
|
Analytical tools
|
-
Previous FMEAs, subject matter expertise, internal
engineering and warranty data, logic of the FMEA process
|
|
|
Process for completion
|
|
|
|
Thoroughness of the analysis
|
|
|
AFD™
can be used as a stand-alone failure prediction/prevention technique or as an
enhancement to traditional methodologies. For example, the synthesis of AFD™
into the FMEA process can be accomplished as follows:
|
FMEA Step
|
AFD Integral
|
|
Potential Failure Mode
|
Failure Prediction mode of
AFD™:
-
Cause – effect diagrams for the system (sub-system,
component)
-
Automatic Inverted Problem formulation
-
Automatic access to AFD knowledge base (Checklists and
Operators)
|
|
Potential Effects of Failure
|
Access
to AFD™
knowledge base, in particular the checklists:
|
|
Potential Causes/Mechanisms of
Failure
|
Application of Failure
Analysis mode of AFD™,
in particular:
-
Cause – effect diagrams for the system (sub-system,
component)
-
Localizing the failure
-
Automatic Inverted Problem formulation
-
Identifying general methods of providing the failure
-
Identifying components necessary for providing the failure
-
Revealing components of the failure among the system
resources
-
Automatic access to AFD™
knowledge base, in particular the checklists:
-
Typical sources of
high danger
-
Transforming a
harmless object into a source of danger
-
Intensifying an
available harmful effect
-
Destroying the system's resistance to a specific effect
|
|
Recommended Actions
|
Application of Prevention
and/or Elimination of the Failure mode of the AFD™,
in particular:
-
Automatic
Problem formulation
-
Automatic access to AFD knowledge base, in particular the
Operators:
-
Eliminating the
causes of the failure
-
Removing the source
of harm or change its properties
-
Modifying the harmful
effect
-
Counteracting the
harmful effect
-
Isolating the system
from the harmful effect
-
Increasing the
system's resistance to the harmful effect
-
Modifying or
substituting the object effected by harm
-
Localizing the
harmful effect
-
Reducing the harmful
effect
-
'Blending in' defects
-
Transient using of a
harmful effect
-
Facilitating detection
|
The
intent of this Fact Sheet is not to denigrate traditional approaches such as
FMEA and HAZOP. They have been used to good purpose in the past and will
undoubtedly continue to be used to good purpose in the future.
The intent is to point out that some of the deficiencies inherent with
these approaches can be minimized if not eliminated altogether. The general
method of “subversion analysis” can be applied by anyone who is
knowledgeable in TRIZ. With the
assistance of the AFD™ software, they have access to automated problem
generation and extensive problem solution databases.
References:
1.
Genrich Altshuller, Boris Zlotin, Alla Zusman, Vitalii Filatov.
“Searching for New Ideas.” Kishniev:
Kartya Moldovenyaska Publishing House, 1989.
2.
Boris Zlotin, Alla Zusman, “Solving All Scientific Problems” Kishniev:
Kartya Moldovenyaska Publishing House, 1989.
3.
Stan Kaplan, “Finding Failures before They Find Us:
An Introduction to The Theory of Scenario Structuring and the Method of
Anticipatory Failure Determination.” Proceedings
of the 9th Symposium on Quality Function Deployment, June, l997. http://www.qfdi.org
4.
Ideation International AFD™ Software, 1999.
http://www.ideationtriz.com